The evident Korean hostility toward the Japanese made it seem expedient and in keeping with American policy toward a liberated nation to remove all Japanese from public office, and as rapidly as possible they, with a few exceptions, were repatriated to Japan. This resulted in a serious shortage of qualified civilians for public health work.
The American personnel problem was no less serious in its own way. The Army readjustment policy returned troops rapidly to the United States so that relatively few officers or enlisted men who entered Korea early in the occupation stayed more than a few months. This rapid turnover made effective work difficult. The problem was further aggravated by personnel shortages. Many officers trained for military government were retained in the United States and separated from service; many subsequently assigned to this duty had no understanding of the purpose of the occupation and, indeed, had no interest in anything but in returning home. In general, those who had training for military government in the Army Training Schools did better work and exhibited a better attitude than did those not so trained.
Of particular concern was the attitude of medical officers who were assigned without preparation; some of these displayed a feeling of resentment and helplessness when they learned that they would be Health Officers. Somehow public health appeared to them as a highly complicated specialty with which the average medical officer could not hope to cope. Fortunately, some of these men took hold very well when confronted with the problems in the field. The assignment called less for technical knowledge than for common sense and a willingness to tackle the work. One of the most effective early public health jobs in Korea was accomplished in an area without a medical officer by a young officer who was sincerely interested in the work.
The lack of trained professional personnel for military government was aggravated by a shortage of service personnel, especially stenographers and typists. The time of those professionally trained could have been utilized to greater advantage had trained administrative assistants been available in adequate numbers.
Supplies were slow in arriving, and the shortage of office supplies, typewriters, and motor vehicles was felt as keenly as was the shortage of scientific equipment and such epidemic control material as smallpox vaccine and DDT.
All of this seriously impaired the efficiency of the professional personnel. As an example, the officer in charge of laboratories spent much time in "scrounging" material from other Army units to rehabilitate laboratory equipment, or to make culture media, in waiting for a jeep to take him to the laboratory, in making out payrolls for his Korean employees, in negotiating with the finance office of the Military Government for expense money, and in typing his own reports, etc., rather than in directing the manufacture of biological products or in training Koreans to do the laboratory work.
The Army took over the detailed administration of government, and directed its operation as the Japanese were relieved. However The Army personnel policy could be greatly improved. Not only should the men be trained in Military Government, but as far as possible they should be limited to men with comparatively short periods of service and with the knowledge that they would be kept overseas not less than a year. In addition, the objectives of the occupation should be made convincingly important to them.
Medical officers must have some training in Military Government, particularly in public health administration. This is more important than is special knowledge about disease conditions in a particular area.
In spite of difficulties, significant contributions were made to the public health of Korea. The most important perhaps were in control of epidemics, in nursing education, in vital statistics, and in the organization of public health and welfare services.
Anticipating that louse-borne typhus fever might become epidemic, plans were made early to combat this threat. Ten thousand cases were reported during the winter prior to the occupation, and it was estimated that 100,000 cases actually occurred. Thus the reservoir of infection was believed to be great. Plans were drawn up cooperatively by the Surgeon's Office, XXIV Corps, the U. S. Army Typhus Commission, and Military Government officers, calling for the immunization of all military and key civilian personnel, refugees and repatriates, residents in focal areas of infection, and all contacts of typhus cases. The plans also called for DDT dusting of refugees, repatriates, residents of focal areas, patients sick with typhus, and their contacts. Blankets and clothes of residents in focal areas were to be dusted also at intervals. The U. S. Army Typhus Commission was to delineate focal areas.
American personnel, utilizing Korean help, trained and supervised Koreans organized in case-finding, vaccinating, and dusting teams. DDT, dust guns, power dusters, vaccine, syringes, and needles were supplied by the Army. Delays in the arrival of equipment and supplies resulted in much frustration and in uneven work throughout the country; however, the critical areas received major attention, and an enormous volume of work was accomplished. While To meet the civilian problem a stock of crude vaccine of unknown potency was available in the national laboratories. This was processed and new vaccine manufactured, so that by May 1946 about 12,000,000 units had been produced. However, it took time to get vaccine into production, and during the winter, while smallpox flourished, it was impossible to meet the demands for vaccine. By May, production was running ahead of demand, and there were indications that the disease was abating. Some U. S. vaccine was provided, but the bulk was produced in Korea. Vaccine was distributed to Korean physicians, and ex-tensive vaccination programs were organized throughout the country, but it is not known how many people were immunized. Vaccine pro--duction was curtailed in May because of the lack of refrigeration facilities in Korea. The likelihood of effective use of smallpox vaccine during the summer seemed poor.
In addition to smallpox vaccine, the laboratory was able, in spite of many difficulties, to produce typhoid and cholera vaccines and many other products in small quantities. During the first winter, it was not able to produce diphtheria antitoxin or toxoid, although the need was great. Inadequate quantities of these products were provided for civilian use by the Army. Considering the many difficulties, the record of the laboratory in Korea is outstanding.
The nursing program is another of the more significant contributions. Prior to the occupation there was no conception of professional nursing in Korea. Usually young and poorly trained, the nurse was not, expected to do bedside nursing, but was literally a servant of the doctor and she found her greatest usefulness in clinics. Such nursing care as a patient received was performed by members of the family who lived with the patient in his hospital room.
Using a few Korean nurses who had vision and a knowledge of professional nursing, the American nurses directing the program established six-week courses in bedside nursing and public health. The short courses were attended by selected nurses from all parts of U. S. Occupied Korea, and at the conclusion of the courses the nurses were sent to various hospitals and health departments for work. Simultaneously, fundamental improvements in the curriculum of nursing schools were developed.
Even in the early months of the Occupation these partially trained nurses were able to make useful contributions to nursing and public health programs. However, as with all educational programs, this one has a long way to go, and its eventual success will require not only the continued training of nurses, but also of Korean physicians who must learn to employ the nurses for the greatest efficiency. The physicians must accept an attitude which will permit nursing to develop into a real profession. The Bureau of Nursing Affairs in the Department of Public Health and Welfare was quite effective and it will be interesting to watch the development of nursing in Korea under its leadership.
The development of a modern vital statistics program may be counted as another important contribution to Korea. Under the Japanese .669 rule, the collection of vital statistics was a function of the Department of Justice and all records were kept in the family Koseki where the information served legal purposes. Eventually the data reached the national Bureau of the Census, and after several years various analyses were published. Because of the delay in publication, and because the analyses were not prepared for public health purposes, the vital statistics were not a useful tool for public health purposes.
A new system was developed, grounded in the Koseki system with which the Koreans were familiar, but which called for copies of all death, birth, marriage, and divorce certificates to be forwarded promptly on a standard form to provincial Bureaus of Vital Statistics in the Public Health and Welfare Departments. By May of 1946, the pattern of organization was clearly defined, forms were printed, personnel trained, and the provincial organizations started. With continued guidance this program should develop satisfactorily.
Fundamental to all these contributions, and others not mentioned, was the separation of public health from the police, the unification of welfare services, and assigning to them an importance in government that they did not have before. With continued good guidance, these improvements should outlive the Occupation and become permanent.
